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May 25, 2018
1 Introduction
In a recent paper, I had proposed an analytical framework to understand Marx’s theory of
ground-rent [1]. An important question had been left unaddressed in the paper: how are the
price and output levels (of the agricultural commodity) determined in a way that can both
take account of fluctuations in market demand and also embed profit-maximizing behaviour
of the capitalist-farmers? In this note, I offer a simple way to think about the determination
of equilibrium levels of price and output for the agricultural commodity that makes explicit
two important dimensions: (a) the role of aggregate demand for the agricultural commodity,
and (b) profit maximizing behaviour of the capitalist farmers.
2 Determination of Price and Output
Consider agricultural production under capitalist relations of production. Capitalist-farmers
rent land from the class of landlords, hire labour (by purchasing labour-power) and put their
capital to produce the agricultural commodity. Suppose there are N plots of land indexed
by i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , N , with each plot being worked by one capitalist-farmer. If N is large,
each capitalist-farmer takes the price of the agricultural commodity as given and decides the
level of output to maximize her profit.
∗Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst, 310 Crotty Hall, 412 N. Pleasant
Street, Amherst MA 01002. Email: dbasu@econs.umass.edu. This is an addendum to my paper, “Marx’s
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If yi and ti denote the level of output and the total cost of production, respectively, on
plot i, then profit income is given by
pii(yi; p) = pyi − ti(yi)
where p denotes the exogenously given (for the individual capitalist farmer) price level and
the total cost of production is a function of the level of output.
A plausible behavioral assumption is that capitalist farmers choose the level of output to
maximize their profit income. Hence, the profit-maximizing (or optimal) level of output of
the agricultural commodity on the i-th plot will be determined by the following condition:
p = mi(yi), i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , N, (1)
where
mi(yi) = t
′
i(yi)
is the marginal cost of production. The conditions in (1) tell us that on each of the plots,
the optimal level of output is determined by equating the marginal cost of production with
the exogenously given price level (because of lack of monopoly power of any individual
capitalist-farmer).
Since the amount of land is fixed, it is plausible to assume that each capitalist-farmer is
operating with an increasing marginal cost of production technology. One way to capture
this is to assume that mi(yi) is a monotonically increasing function of the level of output, yi.
Hence, we can always find an inverse (function) of the marginal cost of production function
to get the profit-maximizing level of output as
yi(p) = m
−1
i (p), (2)
which gives us the supply function for each capitalist-farmer, i.e. it determines the level of
output that a profit-maximizing farmer will choose to produce as a function of the price level.
Since the marginal cost of production is monotonically increasing, each of the individual
supply functions, being the inverse of the marginal cost of production function, will be
monotonically increasing as well.
The determination of the optimal level of output on the i-th plot of land is depicted on
the left panel of Figure 1. Quantity of output is measured on the horizontal axis, and price
is measured on the vertical axis. MC and the profit-adjusted AVC denote the marginal and
the profit-adjusted average variable cost of production curves, respectively.1 If the price level
were denoted by OB (or EC), then the profit-maximizing level of output would be given by
OE, the point where the MC curve is equal to the price level.
1The profit-adjusted AVC curve plots (1 + α) ∗ AV C, where α is the economy-wide average rate of
profit and AVC denotes the average variable cost of production. Given the relationship between averages
and marginals, the MC curve intersects the AVC at the lowest point of the latter. The minimum point of
the AVC is also the minimum point of the profit-adjusted AVC. Since the MC curve is upward-sloping, it
intersects the profit-adjusted curve to the right of the minimum point, as shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Determination of equilibrium level of price and quantity in the market for the
agricultural commodity. The profit-adjusted AVC curve gives (1 + α)(c+ v).
The total supply function for the agricultural output is the sum of the individual supply
functions. Denoting the total supply function for the agricultural output as S(p), we will
have
S(p) =
N∑
i=1
yi(p) =
N∑
i=1
m−1i (p). (3)
with S ′ > 0 because each of the individual supply functions have y′i(p) > 0.
If D(p; z) denotes the total demand function for the agricultural commodity, with z
denoting non-price shift factors and ∂D/∂p < 0, the equilibrium level of the price will be
such that demand and supply are equal
S(p) = D(p). (4)
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The determination of the equilibrium level of the price in the market for the agricultural
commodity is depicted in the right panel of Figure 1. The upward sloping supply curve, S, is
the sum of the individual supply curves given in (3). The downward sloping demand curve,
D, is given by exogenous factors, z. The intersection of the two curves gives the equilibrium
level of the price, which is represented by the height O’B’ (= OB).
Let me summarize the main argument about the determination of the price and output
levels.
• The level of demand in the economy for the agricultural commodity is given by D(p; z).
• The conditions of production (technology) on each plot of land is known and is sum-
marized by the total, average variable and marginal cost of production, ti(.), ki(.) and
mi(.).
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• Given the demand conditions and the conditions of production, (2), (3) and (4) will
determine the equilibrium levels of output and the price level.
3 Determination of Rent
Once the price and output levels have been determined, we can determine the levels of rent
by the procedure outlined in [1]. Let Ri denote the rent on plot i. We know, following the
argument of Marx, that the magnitude of rent is the surplus profit. Hence,
Ri = pyi − (1 + α) yiki(yi) (5)
where ki(yi) = {ci(yi) + vi(yi)} /yi is the average variable cost of production (AVC), and α
is the economy-wide average rate of profit.3 This is the same expression as given in (1) in
[1]. To see this, let ri denote the pre-rent rate of profit realized on the i-th plot. Hence,
ri =
pyi
ci + vi
− 1 (6)
where ci and vi denote the constant and variable capital advanced on the i-th plot of land.
Then, total rent on the i-th plot is given by
Ri = (ci + vi)(ri − α),
which is the same expression as the one given in (1) in [1].
2The total cost of production is given by ti(y) = ci(y) + vi(y) + Ri = ki(y) + Ri, where ci(y) and vi(y)
denote the constant and variable capital advanced for production, and Ri denotes the rent paid to the
landlord. Note that the constant and variable capitals are functions of the level of output, y, and thus, their
sum give us the variable cost of production. On the other hand the rent payment is independent of the level
of output and functions as a fixed cost. Hence, the marginal cost of production will not be affected by the
rent.
3In Figure 1, we plot the profit-adjusted AVC, which is (1 + α) ki(yi).
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We can use Figure 1 to pin down the magnitude of rent. For the situation depicted in
Figure 1, the price level is given by OB and the optimal level of output on the individual
plot is given by OE. The rectangle OBCE represents the total revenue, the rectangle OHDE
represents the amount of income of the capitalist farmer, and the rectangle BCDH - the
shaded area - represents the rent income of the landlord.
4 Components of Rent
Once we know the total rent, we can break it up into its three components: absolute rent,
differential rent of the first variety (DRI), and differential rent of the second variety (DRII).
To do so, we need to first arrange the plots of land according to the average variable cost of
production (or, what I have earlier called, the unit cost of production), ki. Using ki, which
is known for each plot of land, let us index the plot with the highest value of ki as i = 1,
the plot with the next highest value of ki as i = 2, and so on, with the plot with the lowest
value of ki as i = N . Thus, we have now arranged plots according to an increasing order of
“quality”, with i = 1 referring to the “worst plot” and i = N referring to the “best plot”.
We can now decompose the total rent on the i-th plot as
Ri = (ci + vi)(ri − α) = AR +DRIi +DRIIi
where the absolute rent is
AR = (c1 + v1)(r1 − α),
differential rent of the first variety is given by
DRIi = (ci + vi)(ri − r1),
and differential rent of the second variety is given by
DRIIi = [(ci + vi)− (c1 + v1)] (r1 − α).
5 The Role of Demand and Profit Maximization
We can use Figure 1 to get some intuition about the conditions for the generation of rent
and the role of demand (for the agricultural commodity) in that process. For the situation
depicted in Figure 1, the rectangle BCDH represents the rent income of the landlord and the
rectangle OHDE represents the amount of income of the capitalist farmer. Since the capitalist
farmer would not invest his capital in agriculture unless she was ensured the economy-wide
average rate of profit, α, the rectangle OHDE must be equal to the (1 +α) times the capital
advanced (sum of constant and variable capital).
Under capitalist relations of production, a plot of land will be used for cultivation only
when two conditions are satisfied: (a) it generates a positive magnitude of rent for the
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landlord, and (b) the capital invested on it by the capitalist farmer gives her a rate of profit
of α (the economy-wide average rate of profit). In terms of Figure 1, this puts a lower
bound on the price level: if the price level fall below OF (shown in the left panel), then the
capitalist farmer will not invest her capital (because the revenue will not cover the variable
cost of production). This, in turn, puts a lower bound on the level of demand (for the
agricultural commodity): if the level of demand for the agricultural commodity is such that
the equilibrium price level fall below OF, then some plots of land will lie unused.
In Appendix A in [1], I had demonstrated that if the organic composition of capital in
agriculture was sufficiently low and the price level was determined by the principle of zero
net flow of surplus value from agriculture, then there would be positive magnitudes of rent
on all plots of land. The analysis in this addendum suggests that the price level must also
satisfy the additional condition that it be higher than the level represented as OF in the left
panel in Figure 1.
One shortcoming of the analysis in [1] was that it did not make explicit the underlying
decision making process of capitalist farmers regarding the output level. Hence it was vul-
nerable to the fact that the output level used to compute rent was not necessarily the one
that would be chosen by profit-maximizing capitalist farmers. Thus, it was possible that the
magnitudes of rent computed by landlords, and incorporated into rental lease agreements,
were not based on optimal levels of output for profit-maximizing capitalist farmers. This
meant that the decision making process underlying the computation of rent and those that
related to the actual production process were not tightly linked together by conditions of
mutual compatibility.
Consider the discussion in Appendix B in [1]. It was argued in the appendix that Marx’s
calculations about DRII were incorrect. Marx had argued that when there is a rise in
demand, the price of the agricultural commodity would have to rise to 3.5 to make sure that
the capitalist farmer of plot B had the incentive to produce the extra amount of output.
I had argued that the price would remain at 3 (because the average cost of production -
including the average rate of profit - on the worst plot, which was A, was still 3).4 This
reasoning has one problem: it is no longer optimal for the capitalist on plot B to produce
the full 9.5 unit of output. This is because she can make a surplus profit of 0.5 - after paying
the rent of 4 - by producing 3.5 units of output with a capital investment of 5.5 But this
is an anomalous situation because it means that the rent specified in the lease contract did
not account for all of the surplus profit. This means that the calculation of rent and the
production decisions of capitalist farmers have not been made mutually compatible.6
By explicitly incorporating profit-maximizing behavior, this note addresses that lacuna.
Once rents are computed on the basis of output levels that satisfy the marginal cost con-
ditions given in (1), then there will be no incentive for capitalist farmers to deviate from
those output levels. This will imply that there will be no possibility for surplus profit to
remain unallocated to rent. Thus, the computation of rent (by landlords) will be mutually
4See panel C in Table 4 in [1] for details.
5Revenue is 3 ∗ 3.5, and cost of production, including rent, is 5 ∗ 1.2 + 4. Subtracting the latter from the
former leaves 0.5.
6I would like to thank Debarshi Das for pointing out this problem in the argument in Appendix B in [1].
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consistent with profit-maximizing behavior (by capitalist farmers).
6 Some Comparative Statics
There are two interesting comparative static exercises that could be easily carried out with
the help of Figure 1. First, if there is an exogenous increase in demand, other things re-
maining constant, there will be an increase in the magnitude of rent. To see this, note that
the exogenous increase in demand will shift the demand curve in the right panel of Figure 1
rightward. The result will be an increase in both the equilibrium price and quantity. This
will increase the area of the rectangle BCDH, which shows that the magnitude of rent will
increase.
Second, if there is technological progress in agriculture, it will lead to an ambiguous
change in the magnitude of rent. To see this, note that technological progress will lead to
a downward movement of the marginal cost curves, so that the total supply curve in the
right panel of Figure 1 will shift downward. This will lead to an increase in the quantity of
output and a fall in its price. Depending on the elasticity of the supply curve, this can lead
to either a fall or a rise in the magnitude of rent. More inelastic the demand, higher is the
possibility of a fall in the rent.
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